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The Supererogatory, and How to
Accommodate It
D A L E D O R S E Y
University of Kansas
Many find it plausible to posit a category of supererogatory actions. But the
supererogatory resists easy analysis. Traditionally, supererogatory actions are
characterized as actions that are morally good, but not morally required; actions that
go ‘beyond’ the call of our moral obligations. As I shall argue in this article, however,
the traditional analysis can be accepted only by a view with troubling consequences
concerning the structure of the moral point of view. I propose a different analysis that is
extensionally correct, avoids the problems of the traditional view, and, incidentally, also
defuses any objection to act-consequentialism, or any other first-order moral theory, on
grounds that it cannot accommodate the supererogatory.
A traditionally noted feature of act-consequentialism is that it doesn’t
seem to leave room for the supererogatory. Trouble is, supererogatory
acts seem to exist. Urmson writes:
We may imagine a squad of soldiers to be practicing the throwing of live hand
grenades; a grenade slips from the hand of one of them and rolls on the ground
near the squad; one of them sacrifices his life by throwing himself on the
grenade and protecting his comrades with his own body. [Doing so] is clearly
an action having moral status. But if the soldier had not thrown himself on
the grenade would he have failed in his duty? Though clearly he is superior in
some way to his comrades, can we possibly say that they failed in their duty
by not trying to be the one who sacrificed himself? If he had not done so, could
anyone have said to him, ‘You ought to have thrown yourself on that grenade’?
Could a superior have decently ordered him to do it? The answer to all of these
questions is plainly negative.1
Urmson’s case appears to illustrate that, at least on occasion,
individuals can act in ways that go beyond the call of duty. The soldier
sacrificed himself in a way that clearly is morally good, but – contra
act-consequentialism – is certainly not his duty.
So far, so plausible. But the category of the supererogatory resists
easy analysis. Traditionally, supererogatory actions are characterized
as actions that are morally good, but not morally required; actions
that go ‘beyond’ the call of our moral obligations. As I shall argue
in this article, however, the traditional analysis can be accepted
only by a view with troubling consequences concerning the structure
of the moral point of view. I propose a different analysis that is
1 J. O. Urmson, ‘Saints and Heroes’, Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A. Melden
(Seattle, 1958), pp. 198–216, at 202–3.
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extensionally correct, avoids the problems of the traditional view, and,
incidentally, also defuses any objection to act-consequentialism, or any
other first-order moral theory, on grounds that it cannot accommodate
the supererogatory.
I. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
Analyses of the supererogatory have generally assumed three focal
points, the conjunction of which I shall call ‘the traditional view’.
Though some further limit actions that can properly be called
‘supererogatory’, rarely do any views not accept the basic principles
captured in the following brief statement by Rawls:
[Supererogatory acts] are acts of benevolence and mercy, of heroism and self-
sacrifice. It is good to do these actions but it is not one’s duty or obligation.
Supererogatory acts are not required, though normally they would be were it
not for the loss or risk involved for the agent himself.2
The first principle noted by Rawls can be captured as follows:
Permissible not Required: If an act ϕ is supererogatory, ϕ is morally
permissible, but is not morally required.
Permissible not Required holds that one is never morally required – but
is always morally permitted – to perform a supererogatory action.
However, Permissible not Required is clearly insufficient to capture
what it means for an action to go beyond the call of duty. One would
not, for instance, describe the permissible, but not required, action of
double-knotting my shoes as supererogatory. The difference between
saving one’s friends by jumping on a grenade and double-knotting
one’s shoes is that the former and not the latter appears to have a
comparatively positive moral valence. The former and not the latter is:
Morally Good: If an act ϕ is supererogatory, ϕ is especially morally
good or meritorious in comparison to other morally permissible
actions.
Note that Morally Good is a comparative claim. It holds that ϕ-ing is
morally better than some relevant baseline. Of course, this baseline
is not just any old action; actions can be especially morally good as
compared to, say, the bombing of Hiroshima. But this doesn’t mean
they’re supererogatory. Rather, Morally Good holds that supererogatory
actions are not simply permissible, but have a particularly positive
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 117.
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moral status in comparison to actions that, as it were, are merely in
accord with one’s moral obligations.
Consider now the third feature of the traditional view, also noted by
Rawls. Many hold that one essential feature of the supererogatory is
that supererogatory actions are supererogatory in part because they
involve some non-trivial sacrifice to the agent. Though this claim is
controversially strong, a somewhat weaker claim is surely an important
aspect of the traditional view:
But for Sacrifice: A subset (S) of supererogatory actions would have
been morally required but for the fact that they require non-trivial
sacrifice on the part of the agent.3
Take Urmson’s soldier. One of the essential features of his action that
renders it supererogatory is that it is sacrificial. But were it the case
that this soldier could have saved his friends without sacrifice, he
certainly would have been morally required to do so. If I am in a position
to donate half my yearly salary to Oxfam International, but only at
significant cost to my own well-being, doing so is supererogatory. If my
donations fail to affect my well-being, or affect it only trivially, making
these donations is morally required.
A note on But for Sacrifice. S is a proper subset of all supererogatory
actions. Some – like myself – hold that most, even all, supererogatory
actions will involve some sacrifice on the part of the agent. Others
believe that not all supererogatory actions would be morally required
were it the case that there were no agential sacrifice.4 In the remainder
of the article, I will limit my discussion to cases that fall within S (or,
at least, that seem to do so given my considered judgements). These
cases generate serious problems with the traditional view, even if the
relative size of S is very small.5
The traditional view might be supplemented by a number of
additional principles concerning the structure of supererogatory action.
For instance, some6 might argue that the idea of the supererogatory
should be limited to acts that are in some way beneficial, or are
3 But for Sacrifice may not seem like an element in an analysis of the supererogatory,
but rather a simple first-order truth of extension of this concept. I am neutral on these
interpretations. Suffice it to say, any attempt to accommodate the traditional view must
accommodate But for Sacrifice.
4 See, for instance, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, ‘Untying a Knot from the Inside
Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of Supererogation’, Social Philosophy and Policy 27
(2010), pp. 29–63, esp. pp. 47–8. Thanks to Doug Portmore for calling my attention to
this issue.
5 See Horgan and Timmons, ‘Untying’, pp. 50–9.
6 See, for instance, David Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory
(Cambridge, 1982).
358 Dale Dorsey
particularly praiseworthy. But Permissible not Required, Morally Good,
and But for Sacrifice seem to be the beating heart of traditional analyses
of supererogatory actions, whether further principles are required or
not.
II. A CHALLENGE FOR THE TRADITIONAL VIEW7
James Dreier notices a problem for the traditional view:
[The supererogatory] is puzzling. Morality, we are inclined to think, is a
matter of what reasons one has from the moral point of view. When there
is a supererogatory act available, it would be better for you to perform it. So
surely you have a reason, from the moral point of view, to perform the act. You
may have some reason not to perform it, but at least typically you will have
no reason from the moral point of view to refrain from it (if you do have some
such reason, then it will ordinarily be outweighed by the reason you have to
perform, because by hypothesis it is better to perform). But now it is hard to see
how it could be permissible, from the moral point of view, to refrain from doing
something that you have an undefeated reason (from that very point of view)
to do. Everything from the moral point of view speaks in favor of [performing
a supererogatory act], and nothing at all speaks against it. In what sense is it
‘all right,’ ‘permissible,’ ‘not wrong’ to fail to act? There seems to be no sense at
all.8
One way to state this challenge more precisely is to introduce
a modicum of terminology. First, consider the distinction between
a supererogatory action, and a merely erogatory action. Though
both supererogatory and merely erogatory actions are permissible,
supererogatory action goes ‘beyond’ one’s duty. Merely erogatory action
does not. Consider the following case. Imagine that you can react in
one of three ways to a person down on her luck. You can assist her by
going out of your way to buy her a nutritious meal. Second, you can
offer her one dollar. Finally, you can do nothing. Assume that the third
option is morally disallowed and that the first is supererogatory. One
might say, plausibly, that the second is ‘merely erogatory’; it counts
as the fulfilment of one’s moral obligations, but not in a way that
is particularly morally special. The supererogatory action is morally
special in comparison to it.
Second, consider the idea, mentioned by Dreier, of a moral reason.
A moral reason to ϕ is a fact that, morally speaking, counts in favour
of ϕ-ing. Moral reasons come in different strengths. In comparison to
7 This problem is well known. See e.g. Horgan and Timmons, ‘Untying’, pp. 36–8. See
also Douglas Portmore, ‘Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?’, Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice 11 (2008), pp. 369–88, esp. pp. 378–81.
8 James Dreier, ‘Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing
Doesn’t’, Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason, ed. M. Byron
(Cambridge, 2004), pp. 131–54, at 148.
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some moral reason s, a moral reason r might support ϕ-ing in a weaker,
stronger or equivalently strong way. Reasons can also add up to support
actions in stronger or weaker ways: it could be that the collection of
reasons in favour of ϕ-ing is sufficient to render it the case that there
is a stronger balance of moral reasons in favour of ϕ-ing rather than
some other act ψ, for which there is also moral reason.
Given the traditional view, if ψ -ing is merely erogatory, and ϕ-
ing is supererogatory, ϕ-ing must be supported by moral reasons (or
collections of moral reasons) that are stronger than the moral reasons
that support ψ-ing. The reasoning for this runs as follows. If ψ-ing is
both merely erogatory and supported by stronger moral reasons than
ϕ-ing, it would appear that ϕ-ing is certainly not morally meritorious;
one does not behave in a particularly morally good way if one behaves
in a way for which there is weaker moral reason than the act that is
merely erogatory. For the same reason, it cannot be the case that ϕ is
supported by reasons that are equivalent in strength to ψ. This would
entail that ϕ and ψ are of equivalent moral importance or quality. But
this is incompatible with Morally Good. Hence it must be the case
that supererogatory actions are supported by stronger moral reasons
(or a stronger collection of moral reasons) than merely erogatory
actions. With this terminology in mind, the puzzle is easy to see: given
Morally Good, supererogatory actions will be supported by stronger
moral reasons than merely erogatory actions. But given Permissible not
Required, supererogatory actions cannot be morally required: merely
erogatory actions remain permissible. But, in any collection of potential
actions a person might perform, it seems right to say that this person
ought to perform the action that is supported by the strongest balance
of moral reasons. And hence either the supererogatory action will be
required (violating Permissible not Required) or it will not be supported
by stronger moral reasons (violating Morally Good).
Of course, there is an easy way out. The purported problem seems
to assume that intra-moral rationality – put roughly, the relationship
between moral reasons and moral requirements – is of a particular
kind: one is morally required to perform the action for which there
is strongest moral reason. Call this ‘the standard view’ of intra-moral
rationality. If the standard view is correct, the traditional view of the
supererogatory cannot be accommodated. But if we reject the claim
that we are morally required to perform the action for which there is
strongest moral reason (or strongest balance of reasons), we can say it
is permissible to ψeven if there is stronger moral reason to ϕ. However,
though this is clearly the right response for partisans of the traditional
view, it is not enough simply to say that one can be permitted to refrain
from performing actions for which there is strongest moral reason.
To solve the puzzle one has to adopt an alternative account of the
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relationship between moral reasons and moral requirements such that
the peculiar character of supererogatory action can be accommodated.
The following two sections consider three potential alternatives.
None, I argue, is successful. The first two (each a version of a satisficing
approach to intra-moral rationality) cannot accommodate But for
Sacrifice. The third can accommodate the principles of the traditional
view, but ends up with very implausible results in so doing. I conclude
that we must reject the traditional view in favour of an alternative
analysis of the supererogatory.
III. SATISFICING
One alternative account of intra-moral rationality is a satisficing
view. According to Dreier, ‘Ethical satisficing is structurally similar
to rational satisficing. Ethical satisficing theory says that it can be
morally right to choose an alternative that is good enough . . . even
though there is a better alternative available.’9 On a scheme of moral
satisficing, one violates a moral obligation only if one acts in a way that
is not morally good enough. The content of satisficing views will differ
markedly; in this section, I consider the simplest form of satisficing,
one that sets an absolute target (call this t), and holds that one need
only perform actions that meet this target threshold. Call this ‘simple
satisficing’.
Simple satisficing accommodates Permissible not Required and
Morally Good. If we accept that one is morally required only to perform
an action that is at least as morally good as the target threshold, this
can leave open the possibility that actions that are morally better than
the threshold are permissible, but not morally required. Furthermore,
moral satisficing can explain why supererogatory action is plausibly
morally heroic or ‘beyond’ the call of one’s duty: if one’s duty is only
to conform to the relevant threshold, any action that is morally better
than the threshold is, plausibly, especially morally good in comparison
to action that barely passes the threshold.
Despite its virtues, simple satisficing cannot accommodate the
traditional view. To embrace moral satisficing, one must reject But
for Sacrifice. Assuming that ψ-ing is ‘morally good enough’ (i.e. just
barely passes the threshold), satisficing permits ψ-ing whether or not
a morally better action involves any sacrifice at all. And hence there
can be no supererogatory action that would have been required but for
sacrifice, as it were.
But simple satisficing is not the only form of satisficing. Dreier
advocates a form of intra-moral rationality that may be more promising.
9 Dreier, ‘Satisficing’, p. 142.
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In considering the purportedly supererogatory action of helping to
return a stranger’s hat that has blown away in the wind, Dreier argues
that there are, in fact, two moral points of view:
To borrow from virtue theory, one point of view we can adopt is the point of
view of the perfectly virtuous agent . . . or, less ambitiously, just the beneficent
agent. From this perspective, there is everything to be said in favor of fetching
the stranger’s hat and nothing to be said against it. Failing to fetch the hat is
falling short of perfection (in this dimension) and not permissible at all. But
we can also adopt a less ambitious perspective – that of the just person (maybe
‘dutiful’ would be a better word). From the point of view of justice, there isn’t
anything to be said in favor of going to all that trouble to get a stranger’s hat.
If I do go to all the trouble, that doesn’t make me more just. The suggestion
is that judgments of wrongness are made from the point of view of this less
demanding virtue, whereas judgments of what would be better or worse are
made from the more ambitious point of view.10
Dreier’s account is interesting, and much more can and should be
said about it than I can or will say here. For Dreier’s view, intra-
moral rationality is a mix of two different moral points of view. The
point of view of ‘justice’ determines the moral permissibility and
impermissibility of actions. For Dreier, however, there is no reason
of justice to fetch the stranger’s hat. If so, refraining from so doing is
permissible, not required. The second point of view, the point of view
of ‘beneficence’, determines the relative goodness or badness of actions,
but does not say anything about the permissibility or impermissibility
of these actions. Reasons of beneficence rank-order actions, but that
ϕ-ing is supported by greater reasons of beneficence can never count
in favour of a requirement to ϕ. Putting these points of view together,
one performs a supererogatory action if one performs an action that is
better, as determined by the point of view of beneficence, than the
merely erogatory action (which one might interpret as the morally
worst action that is compatible with the requirements of justice).
But Dreier’s view inherits the problems of simple satisficing. It also
fails to accommodate But for Sacrifice. Take Urmson’s case. Dreier, to
claim successfully that saving one’s comrades at a sacrifice of one’s
own life is supererogatory, must say that, from the point of view of
justice, ‘there isn’t anything to be said in favour’ of saving one’s fellow
soldiers. Of course, there is something to be said in favour of rescuing
one’s comrades from the point of view of beneficence, and this is what
renders one’s action supererogatory. But Dreier’s view cannot accept
the further claim that were there no sacrifice involved, one is morally
required to save one’s comrades. If ‘there isn’t anything to be said
in favour’ of so doing from the point of view of justice, and justice is
10 Dreier, ‘Satisficing’, p. 149.
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the point of view that determines ‘judgements of wrongness’, it seems
difficult to see how Dreier might deliver the verdict that it is wrong
not to save one’s comrades under any circumstances at all. It would
seem that any reason to save one’s friends is a reason of beneficence not
justice, and hence this reason cannot influence the extent to which it
would be wrong not to save one’s friends when it is of no sacrifice.
Of course, Dreier claims that the domain of justice is the domain
of ‘right and wrong’. Hence we might be tempted to suggest that my
requirement to save my comrades if it is of no sacrifice is a requirement
of the point of view of justice. Doing so in this case does ‘make me
more just’. But one cannot make this claim and maintain the integrity
of Dreier’s proposal. To allow Dreier to claim that, e.g., saving one’s
comrades by sacrificing one’s life is supererogatory, he must say that the
reason to save one’s comrades is a reason of beneficence: it is something
that makes the act ‘better’, but not morally required. But to say that one
is required to save one’s comrades when there is no sacrifice involved
would seem to collapse the distinction between reasons of beneficence
and reasons of justice. Such a position seems to require reasons of
betterness to play a role in determining one’s moral obligations, after
all. But if this is the case, it is difficult to see how such reasons wouldn’t
play a role in the case in which saving one’s comrades would entail
sacrifice. If so, we must now search for an alternative form of ‘justice
rationality’ that would allow one to perform a suboptimal act from the
point of view of justice when sacrifice is involved. But this just is the
challenge for the traditional view.
The following point is critical. It could very well be that some
supererogatory action would be supererogatory even if no sacrifice were
involved. However, even if there is one action that falls within S, one
and only one action of which it can rightly be said that without sacrifice
it would be required, satisficing views fail.
IV. THE PORTMORE/RAZ VIEW
The failures of satisficing approaches trace to the same source: neither
could allow that a lack of agential sacrifice would, of itself, render a
previously supererogatory action morally required. To accommodate
But for Sacrifice, then, one must allow that agential sacrifice (or lack
thereof) can influence the content of moral obligations.
But the three tenets of the traditional view entail that agential
sacrifice must play this role in a special, and perhaps non-
straightforward, way. By But for Sacrifice, any supererogatory action ϕ,
falling within S, must be supported by reasons that would be sufficient
to require ϕ, were it not for the sacrifice to the agent involved. But,
by Permissible not Required, ϕ cannot be required as it stands. Hence
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the sacrifice involved in ϕ-ing must itself must have some sort of force
in determining our moral requirements. But this force is either the
product of per se moral reasons or not. If this force is the product of
per se moral reasons, the sacrifice, which justifies a merely erogatory
act ψ in comparison to ϕ, would itself have moral significance or per
se moral weight, strong enough morally to justify in comparison to the
reasons in favour of ϕ-ing. And if this justificatory strength is the result
of moral factors themselves, it cannot be that ϕ-ing is morally special in
comparison to ψ-ing; both are justified by significant moral concerns.11
And if this is right, by Morally Good, ϕ-ing is not supererogatory. Hence
the force of agential sacrifice to justify merely erogatory action (and
render supererogatory action unrequired) must, at least in part, be the
product of reasons that themselves lack per se moral weight. Call any
view that accepts the possibility that the non-moral significance of, e.g.,
prudential sacrifice can influence the moral permissibility of actions a
version of the ‘Portmore/Raz view’.
Two versions of the Portmore/Raz view are offered, not coincidentally,
by Douglas Portmore and Joseph Raz. According to Raz, the
supererogatory is the outcome of a set of reasons known as ‘exclusionary
permissions’. Raz explains this idea as follows: ‘The permission to
refrain from performing an act [of] supererogation is an exclusionary
permission, a permission not to act on certain reasons. An act is a
supererogatory act only if it is an act which one ought to do on the
balance of reasons and yet one is permitted not to act on the balance of
reasons.’12
For Raz, an exclusionary permission is a not a per se moral reason
(it is not part of the ‘balance of [moral] reasons’), but is rather a
‘second-order’ reason, viz., a reason that allows a person to ignore
the balance of moral reasons, or to refuse to grant them weight in
one’s moral deliberation. Surely there are strong moral reasons to save
one’s comrades by jumping on a grenade. But the soldier is permitted,
given his exclusionary permission, to exclude these reasons in his
moral deliberation. And hence, on this view, refraining from so doing is
morally permissible given that the soldier maintains an exclusionary
permission to ignore the moral reasons in question.
11 See B. C. Postow, ‘Supererogation Again’, Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (2005), pp.
245–53. Incidentally, this very problem fells many of the views discussed by J. P. Vessel
in ‘Supererogation for Utilitarianism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2010), pp.
199–219. Each view there discussed does allow for the possibility of a range of morally
permissible acts, but cannot deliver the claim that the supererogatory act in question is
particularly morally special in comparison to others, because per se moral factors justify
both the supererogatory and the merely erogatory action.
12 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1990), p. 94.
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This proposal appears to accommodate the traditional view:
Permissible not Required is accommodated, given that (in the case
of the soldier) jumping on the grenade is perfectly permissible: the
balance of first-order moral reasons favours doing so. But, given this
exclusionary permission, one can fail to take these reasons into account,
rendering the supererogatory action unrequired. Morally Good is also
accommodated. The balance of first-order moral reasons, after all,
favours the supererogatory action. Though the soldier has ‘exclusionary
permission’ to ignore the moral reasons in question, the fact that there
are such reasons allows Raz to claim that following through on the
sacrifice is morally superior: it is an act that conforms to the balance of
first-order moral reasons one nevertheless has permission to exclude.
Raz’s view can also be interpreted to accommodate But for Sacrifice.
Its ability to do so depends on what triggers an exclusionary permission.
One thought might be that the exclusionary permission is present in
any case in which the ‘first-order’ reasons are reasons of beneficence.
But this interpretation fails to accommodate But for Sacrifice, because
this exclusionary permission would be present whether or not the
beneficent action requires agential sacrifice, and hence Raz’s view
would be no less problematic than Dreier’s. But one could say that
the exclusionary permission is triggered only in cases in which the
sacrifice to the agent in question is strong enough. If we do this, Raz’s
view successfully accommodates But for Sacrifice. For supererogatory
actions falling within S, the exclusionary permission is triggered by the
sacrifice involved; no sacrifice, no permission. On this interpretation,
Raz’s view does exactly what I argued must be done to accommodate
the traditional view: it treats agential sacrifice as lacking ‘first-order’
moral importance, but nevertheless justifies merely erogatory action
(by triggering an exclusionary permission to ignore the moral reasons
that favour supererogatory action).
Portmore’s version of the Portmore/Raz view uses a slightly different
mechanism, but with a similar upshot. Following Joshua Gert,13
Portmore exploits an important ambiguity in the way reasons operate.
Note that the common understanding of reasons, i.e. as facts that ‘count
in favour of’ particular actions, is vague.14 Reasons may have requiring
strength, i.e. may count in favour of a requirement to ϕ, or justifying
strength, i.e. may count in favour of the permission to ϕ. According to
Portmore, non-moral reasons (such as prudential reasons to avoid first-
personal sacrifice) can possess moral justifying strength. For Portmore,
non-moral reasons (including prudential reasons) can count in favour
13 Joshua Gert, Brute Rationality (Cambridge, 2004).
14 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for asking me to address this ambiguity.
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of moral justification to ψ rather than ϕ, despite the fact that ϕ-ing is
morally better (i.e. supported by stronger moral reasons) than ψ.15 Non-
moral reasons (including prudential reasons) are sufficient to morally
justify merely erogatory action when, say, the prudential reason not to
ϕ is of sufficient weight compared to the moral reason to perform the
supererogatory action.
Portmore’s view can accommodate Permissible not Required, because
the reasons that tell in favour of merely erogatory actions have
the power to justify merely erogatory action (and hence render
supererogatory action unrequired), but do not have the power to
require merely erogatory action, maintaining permission to perform
supererogatory action. In addition, it can accommodate Morally Good.
The moral justification allotted to a merely erogatory act is a result of
non-moral reasons; this allows us to say that a supererogatory act is
morally superior (since it is supported by a stronger balance of moral
reasons), though not required (given that the merely erogatory action,
though morally worse, is morally justified as a result of non-moral
reasons). Further, it can accommodate But for Sacrifice. In cases like
that of Urmson’s soldier, were there no sacrifice, there would have
been no relevant non-moral reasons that would justify a morally worse
act, and hence only the previously supererogatory act (i.e. saving one’s
comrades) would be permissible.
The Portmore/Raz view, in either iteration, can accommodate the
traditional view. Indeed, as I argued above, only the Portmore/Raz view
can adequately accommodate the traditional view. What remains is to
determine whether the Portmore/Raz view is plausible. I claim that it
is not.
V. THE BOUNDS OF MORAL JUSTIFICATION
The best way to see this is to compare two cases (for the purposes of
brevity, I focus on Raz’s statement of the view; the problems are the
same for any version of the Portmore/Raz view). The first is:
Gus: Gus finds himself the recipient of an inheritance from a wealthy
relative. This inheritance will allow Gus to buy a new car, which
Gus desires to do, and which will allow Gus to see much more of
his significant other, who lives in a distant town. Alternatively, Gus
could donate his inheritance to Oxfam International, which would
save ten people from death.
On reflection, it is plausible to say that Gus’s donation would be
supererogatory. Not only this, it seems plausible to say that were there
15 Portmore, ‘Override’, pp. 372, 375 n. 12.
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no cost involved in saving ten people from death, Gus would surely be
morally required to do so. Should Gus fail to save these ten from death
at no cost to himself, this is surely grounds for moral complaint. Hence
we should accept:
1. Gus’s potential donation would be supererogatory, falling
within S.
So far so good. But before I introduce the second case, let’s shift gears
slightly. There is surely some reasonably serious harm to which we may
morally permissibly subject an individual for the purposes of saving
some number of people (perhaps large) from death. Moral theories will
differ on the seriousness of harm-to-number of people saved ratio; act-
consequentialism, for instance, will claim that one person harmed will
justify one person saved, for any harm short of death. Others will hold
that there are agent-centred restrictions against harm, and that any
reason to harm can only be outweighed by a larger amount of good,
a larger number of individuals saved. For any plausible moral theory,
however, there is some number of people (n) we could save from death
that would morally justify, say, torturing one person, even leaving other
things equal (e.g. that the agent is not among those who would be
saved). If so, the moral reason to save n from death is of (at least)
equivalent strength to the moral reason not to torture. Further, with
each harm of decreasing seriousness, the moral reason not to harm
someone in that less serious way is of equivalent strength to the reason
to save fewer individuals. If we are licensed to torture an arbitrary
person (call him ‘Jerry’) to save, say, 1,000 people from death, surely
we are morally justified in harming Jerry in a less significant way to
save some lesser number of people. With all this in mind, the following
seems plausible:
2. Other things (including non-moral reasons) being equal, one is
morally justified in beating Jerry up to save ten from death.
However, if we accept (2), a problematic result arises. Consider now the
second case:
Stan: Stan knows that Jerry has just inherited a substantial amount
of money from a wealthy relative. Were Stan to intimidate Jerry into
giving him the money as a result of beating Jerry up, this would be
a prudential benefit to Stan, given that this would allow him to buy
a new car, from which he will derive pleasure, and which will allow
Stan to see much more of his significant other, who lives in a distant
town. (Assume that Stan would avoid punishment.)
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If we accept (1) and (2), and the account of exclusionary permissions
that will successfully accommodate the traditional view, it would seem
that Stan is perfectly justified – morally justified, mind you – in beating
up Jerry to buy a new car. Here’s why. Gus’s sacrifice triggers an
exclusionary permission to refrain from saving ten. But Stan’s potential
sacrifice (i.e. not getting his new car) is identical to Gus’s. And so one
would assume that this sacrifice would also generate an exclusionary
permission to beat up Jerry.
The obvious response is to hold that the relevant exclusionary
permission is triggered only in Gus’s case, not Stan’s case. But, given
(2), this is not tenable. As we have already seen, it is at least as
morally important (that is, as important from the perspective of first-
order moral reasons) to save ten as it is not to beat up Jerry. And
so one would expect that if an exclusionary permission allows one to
exclude the moral reasons in favour of saving ten in Gus’s case, it
must allow Stan to exclude the moral reasons not to beat up Jerry.
Of course, there are differences between the two cases. Importantly,
Gus faces moral reasons of beneficence; Stan faces moral reasons
of non-maleficence. But this, in itself, cannot make a difference to
the possibility of exclusionary permission unless that difference is
reflected in the first-order moral significance of the reasons in question.
And given (2), it is not: saving ten is at least as morally important
as refraining from beating up Jerry.16 The problem is identical for
Portmore’s view. Given the relative moral significance (as laid out in (2) )
of saving and refraining to harm, any statement of the Portmore/Raz
view will have the result that Stan is morally justified in beating
up his neighbour given the moral justificatory significance of agential
sacrifice. If agential sacrifice (by whatever mechanism) morally justifies
pursuit of one’s own interests against an action supported by moral
reasons of strength s, it should also morally justify pursuit of one’s
interest against any other action supported by reasons of strength s-
or-weaker.
16 One could, perhaps, adopt a form of particularism and claim that further features
of the case (such as the fact that the sacrifice-creating act is an instance of beneficence
rather than an instance of non-maleficence) might defeat or disable the exclusionary
permission (or, in Portmore’s language, justifying reason). (See, for instance, Jonathan
Dancy, Ethics without Principles (Oxford, 2004), ch. 3.) I don’t have any per se beef
with particularism. But such a move seems unavailable in this case. It would appear
that all of the relevant facts of the case are accounted for in the favouring/disfavouring
considerations, rather than in the enabling/disabling conditions of the case. In particular,
the only relevant potential disabler of the exclusionary permission, in Stan’s case, is the
fact that to gain this prudential advantage, he would have to act in a maleficent way
towards Jerry. But this is clearly a disfavourer – which is itself not strong enough to
override justification to save ten, and which in turn is not strong enough to override
justification to follow through on one’s prudential interest in a new car – not a disabler.
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Care is required here. The mere fact that Stan could be morally
justified in beating up Jerry to buy a new car shouldn’t by itself be
regarded as a fatal result of the traditional view. After all, many views
– including act-consequentialism, for instance – will hold that such an
act can be morally justified, especially if Stan’s well-being is furthered
by a new car more than Jerry is burdened by the beating. But the
problem for the Portmore/Raz view is not this verdict per se, but rather
the fact that Stan can be morally justified in beating up Jerry even if his
interests are, comparatively, of insignificant moral weight (given that
the justificatory power agential sacrifice, according to the Portmore/Raz
view, outstrips its per se non-moral significance). This verdict is simply
incredible, and must be rejected. If Stan is justified, this justification
cannot be moral justification.
One important implication of the above argument is that it doesn’t
matter in the slightest what the relevant moral reasons are, or what
moral factors might favour refusing to beat up Jerry versus what
factors favour saving ten from death. One could, in principle, declare
(in Kantian fashion) that the reason not to beat Jerry up is derived
from an interest in not treating Jerry as a mere means, or that this
reason is derived from Jerry’s moral rights, or that Stan is under some
particularly morally relevant relationship to Jerry, or is accountable
to Jerry, in a way that tells against beating him up. Furthermore, one
could assume that the reason to save ten is provided by their overall
aggregate welfare, respect for persons, or any other reason. Because the
reason – whatever it is – not to beat up Jerry is not stronger than the
reason to save ten (in so far as one is allowed to beat up Jerry to save
ten), and because the relevant agential sacrifice is significant enough
to justify refusing to save ten (as seen in Gus’s case), it must also be
significant enough to justify beating up Jerry. To say otherwise is to
accept a logic of exclusionary permission that seems utterly arbitrary.
The partisan of the traditional view could deny either (1) or (2).
But (1) seems obvious; indeed, Gus’s potential donation seems a
paradigmatic instance of the supererogatory; furthermore, if we can
save such individuals from death at no cost to ourselves and fail to
do so, those whom we failed to save surely could complain on moral
grounds. This leaves (2). One might complain that I have no genuine
reason to believe (2); after all, that we are morally justified in beating
up one to save ten, rather than, say, eleven, seems arbitrary. But
the specific number identified by (2) is neither here nor there; the
number can change without changing the seriousness of the problem.
Imagine that Gus could save 100 people from death as a result of his
Oxfam donation. Many would say that even under these conditions,
Gus’s donation remains supererogatory; his prudential reason is strong
enough morally to justify his refusal to save 100 from death. But to deny
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that one could be morally justified in beating someone up to save 100
people from death is positively absurd. Hence Stan’s prudential reason,
which is identical to Gus’s, must also have the power morally to justify
beating up Jerry, in so far as refraining from beating up Jerry is not
morally more important than saving 100. One might put this in general
terms: there is some number (‘n’) of individuals Gus could save from
death at the cost of his new car and new life with his significant other,
for which an exclusionary permission is no longer applicable. For the
Portmore/Raz view to survive, we must say that we are unjustified in
harming someone like Jerry to save any sub-n number of people from
death. But this claim is worse than dubious.
The Portmore/Raz view accommodates the traditional view. I
have argued, however, that given straightforward assumptions, and
straightforward reasoning, this view implausibly expands the bounds
of moral justification. This is not to say, of course, that there is no way
to avoid this conclusion. But the problem here seems robust enough
to warrant the search for an alternative to the traditional view. In
what follows, I offer just such an alternative that is (a) satisfying in
itself and (b) keeps the boundaries of moral justification right where
we want them.
VI. THE SUPEREROGATORY
To begin, consider the notion of a moral requirement. Moral
requirements are, well, just that: if I fail to conform to a moral
requirement, this entails that I will have behaved immorally, or in
a morally unjustified way. But there are many different sorts of
requirements – not just moral – that I face. I face legal requirements,
prudential requirements, requirements of etiquette, requirements of
my neighbourhood association. Sometimes these requirements will
conflict. But in cases of conflict, it seems natural to ask ourselves what
we ought to do really, or all-things-considered. More generally, in the
case of conflicting requirements, how should I live? For the sake of
brevity, I will refer to this ‘all-things-considered’ requirement, which
is distinct from, e.g., moral, legal or prudential requirements, as the
‘rational’ requirement, or rational ‘ought’.
I take this conceptual territory to be familiar. Furthermore, we have
an intuitive grasp on some of the answers to the questions asked above:
most would agree that it is more important to conform to a moral norm
than a norm of one’s neighbourhood association. This is reflective of a
standard assumption, viz. that morality is the most important domain,
at least in determining how I all-things-considered ought to act. In
particular, a standard analysis of the relationship between rational
and moral requirements holds that the requirements of morality are
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rationally supreme: if one is morally required to ϕ, one is thereby
rationally required to ϕ.
But just for the sake of argument, let’s say that morality is not
supreme. Let’s say that, in some cases, immorality can be be rationally
permitted.17 If we do this, it seems to me a natural – and alternative
– way to understand the supererogatory emerges. Take the following
case.
Rose: Rose is a retiree with a substantial pension, and lives
comfortably. Rose could get by with less, but this would require her
to give up some things she enjoys doing. Assume now that Rose
is morally required to assist others with her resources rather than
spending her resources on herself. Assume also that Rose is not
rationally required to assist those whom she could assist. Imagine
now that Rose dedicates substantial time and money to a local family,
themselves down on their luck. Rose provides for their food, lodging,
and child care, which is burdensome, and leaves her unable to live
the life she would otherwise want to.
How would we describe Rose’s action? Ex hypothesi, Rose behaves in
accordance with her moral obligations. But also, ex hypothesi, Rose
is not rationally required to do so. One might, of course, simply
describe Rose’s action as an instance of action that conforms to a
moral requirement. But that doesn’t seem to say it all; given our
assumptions, Rose’s action is not just morally required, Rose’s action
is morally required in a way that isn’t required of her. Though it is
morally required, it is – one could correctly say – ‘beyond the call of
duty’.
I want to be very clear about what I take Rose’s case to establish.18
I won’t assert that her case, by itself, makes for an argument that one
can, as a matter of practical rationality, behave immorally. Perhaps
the assumptions I’ve described in the case are plausible; perhaps they
are not. What matters at this point in the argument, though, is not
the plausibility of these assumptions per se, but rather the way in
which we might be tempted to describe Rose’s actions under these
assumptions. If we believe the case as described, i.e. that Rose is, in
fact, morally required to help but rationally permitted not to help, we
would in fact reasonably describe Rose’s helping as an instance of the
supererogatory: an action that is morally better than Rose’s duty. It is
surely, as Rawls says, ‘an act of benevolence and mercy, of heroism and
self-sacrifice’.
17 See Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good (Oxford, 2007), ch. 1; Philippa Foot, ‘Morality
as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, Virtues and Vices (Oxford, 1978), pp. 1–18.
18 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer.
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Reflection on Rose’s case seems to offer an alternative to the
traditional view. Rather than holding that supererogatory actions are
morally good but not morally required, one might say that, very roughly,
supererogatory actions are morally good, but not rationally required.
This proposal requires rethinking of each of the tenets of the
traditional view. First, Permissible not Required, on this view, becomes:
Permissible not Required II: If an act ϕ is supererogatory, ϕ is
rationally permissible, but is not rationally required.
Morally Good becomes:
Morally Good II: If an act ϕ is supererogatory, ϕ is especially morally
good or meritorious in comparison to other rationally permissible
actions.
But for Sacrifice becomes:
But for Sacrifice II: A subset (S) of supererogatory actions would have
been rationally required but for the fact that they require non-trivial
sacrifice on the part of the agent.
Though this proposal, like the traditional view, permits of a number of
potential additions and supplementary principles, these theses are the
heart of what I call ‘the anti-rationalist view’.
The anti-rationalist view is attractive when compared to the
traditional view. The key advantage is that the anti-rationalist view has
no need of an alternative account of intra-moral rationality. The anti-
rationalist view is perfectly free to say that one is morally required to
conform to the strongest balance of moral reasons. This is an advantage
for two reasons. First, this view is prima facie plausible (as noted by
Dreier). If we can both accommodate the supererogatory and accept
the standard account of intra-moral rationality, this is a comparative
boon. But even aside from its prima facie plausibility, the ability
to avoid an alternative account of intra-moral rationality saves the
anti-rationalist view from the implausible results of the Portmore/Raz
view. Because those wishing to accommodate the traditional view
must accept some version or other of the Portmore/Raz view, any
problems with the Portmore/Raz view bleed into the traditional view.
And problems there are: the Portmore/Raz view implausibly expands
the boundaries of moral justification (as explored in section V). But
because the anti-rationalist view can accept a standard account of intra-
moral rationality, this problem is avoided.
One immediate objection should be discussed. The anti-rationalist
view is compatible with a standard account of intra-moral rationality,
i.e. with the view that one is morally required to perform the action
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for which there is strongest moral reason. But, on the anti-rationalist
view, supererogatory actions are those which are morally better than is
rationally required. But given that one is morally required to perform
the morally best actions, this entails that sometimes morally required
action will be supererogatory. This might be thought a non-starter.19
Of course, I do allow that morally required action can, on occasion,
be supererogatory. But this is a feature of my analysis, not a defect.
It would be a defect if, conceptually speaking, supererogatory action
cannot be morally required. But this is not the case. The concept
of the supererogatory for which we seek an illuminating analysis is
expressed by, e.g., the thought that some actions go ‘beyond’ one’s
duty. The traditional view offers a conception of this concept: that
supererogatory actions are morally good, but not morally required.
But the traditional view is not conceptually true; it is a theory of
the supererogatory that can (and, I argue, should) be denied. Thus
it is no objection to the anti-rationalist view that the anti-rationalist
view (sometimes) treats morally required action as superero-
gatory.
Furthermore, the anti-rationalist view is faithful to the concept
of the supererogatory. Take Urmson’s soldier. Urmson appears to
indicate that jumping on a live grenade to save others is morally
superior to refraining from so doing, but that it is not a feature of
any individual’s ‘duty’. But one has a duty to perform only those
actions one is rationally required to perform. If conforming to a moral
requirement is not rationally required, one has no duty to conform
to such a requirement. Hence it is perfectly acceptable to say of this
case that one has no duty to conform, and also to say that, e.g., we
could not ‘possibly say that they failed in their duty by not trying to
be the one who sacrificed himself ’, or that ‘If he had not done so’ we
would not have ‘said to him “You ought to have thrown yourself on that
grenade” ’. Furthermore, because he had sufficient rational permission
not to jump on the grenade, no ‘superior’ could ‘have decently ordered
him to do it’ (given the strength of the prudential reasons against
doing it).
I do not wish to gainsay the popular view that supererogatory action
cannot be morally required. Nevertheless, it seems to me that this
intuition is misleading. It sounds right to say that supererogatory
actions cannot be morally required because we have a tendency to
identify our duty with our moral duty: we have a tendency to believe
that moral requirements are rationally supreme. As noted here, this is
a common presumption in our general thought about the relationship
between practical rationality and moral requirements. Under these
19 See, for instance, Dreier, ‘Satisficing’, p. 149.
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conditions, supererogatory acts cannot be morally required. But if we
reject this connection, we are perfectly licensed to say that sometimes
moral requirements go beyond our duty. Sometimes we have no duty
to conform to moral requirements any more than we have a duty to
conform to, e.g., legal requirements or requirements of etiquette. If so,
there is no pressure to declare that supererogatory actions cannot be
morally required.
VII. HOW TO ACCOMMODATE THE SUPEROGATORY
My proposal is to treat supererogatory actions not as morally better
than is morally required, but as morally better than is rationally
required. But there are two potential ways this analysis might go
wrong. First, it could be that the anti-rationalist view simply doesn’t
work; it might be that there is no account of all-things-considered
reasons that could accommodate the anti-rationalist view. Second, it
could be that, even if there is such an account of the rational ‘ought’,
this proposal, like the Portmore/Raz view, is just implausible. Because
the second objection awaits a response to the first, I discuss the first
objection here, and leave the second until section VIII.
Is the anti-rationalist view possible? Obviously, for this view to work
we must be anti-rationalists about morality; we must believe that one
can be all-things-considered justified in refusing to perform morally
required action. However, anti-rationalism comes in many shapes and
sizes, many of which clearly cannot accommodate the existence of
supererogatory actions. To see this, consider the various ways one might
construe the relationship between moral and rational requirements.20
One common thing to say about this relationship runs as follows:
Authority: If x has moral reason to ϕ at t, x has a practical reason to
ϕ at t.
Authority holds that morality generates practical reasons: that ϕ-ing
is supported by moral reasons entails that there is some practical
reason to conform to it. But Authority is very weak. Authority is
compatible with the claim that moral considerations are trumped
by other considerations, such as prudential considerations. However,
one must obviously accept Authority to accommodate the existence
of supererogatory actions on the anti-rationalist view. Without doing
so, any practical reason whatsoever not to ϕ renders ϕ-ing practically
20 A helpful introduction to the relationship between morality and practical reasons is
offered by David Brink, ‘Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy’,
Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. G. Cullity and B. Gaut (Oxford, 1997), pp. 255–92.
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irrational even if ϕ-ing is morally required. This would be tantamount
to the rejection of Permissible not Required II.
However, to accommodate the supererogatory, one must deny a
stronger association between morality and rationality. One must deny:
Supremacy: If x has stronger moral reason to ϕ at t rather than to ψ
at t, it is irrational for x to ψ rather than ϕ at t.
Supremacy holds that moral reasons are rationally overriding:
whenever morality holds that one ought to ϕ rather than ψ, it is all-
things-considered irrational to ψ rather than ϕ. Given the standard
account of intra-moral rationality, Supremacy is equivalent to:
Supremacy∗: If x is morally required to ϕ at t rather than to ψ at t, it
is irrational for x to ψ rather than ϕ at t.
The anti-rationalist view cannot accept Supremacy (and hence must
also reject Supremacy∗, given its embrace of a standard account of intra-
moral rationality). To accept the existence of supererogatory actions (on
the anti-rationalist’s analysis), it must be the case that one occasionally
has rational permission to behave in a morally suboptimal way, which
Supremacy denies. On this view immorality – failure to conform to
one’s moral obligations – can, on occasion, be rationally justified
given the possibility of other sorts of reasons, including prudential,
aesthetic, legal, etc., reasons. This is not to say that conformity to
moral requirements will never be rationally required. But, one might
say, in cases in which non-moral (including prudential) considerations
are strong enough, one is rationally permitted not to conform to the
strongest balance of moral reasons.
But the denial of Supremacy and the acceptance of Authority does not
guarantee that supererogatory actions, like Rose’s, will be rationally
permitted. It must be that people are rationally allowed to perform
actions that are morally better than those that are rationally required.
Hence, the anti-rationalist view must accept:
Permission: If, for x at t, a particular act ψ is rationally permitted,
and, for x at t, ϕ-ing is supported by stronger moral reasons than
ψ-ing, ϕ-ing is rationally permitted for x at t.
Permission holds that all action that is morally better than is rationally
permissible is rationally permitted. To accommodate the anti-
rationalist view, one must accept Permission but deny Supremacy(∗).21
21 Though there may be many additional possibilities, my preferred way to guarantee
Permission in light of a denial of Supremacy would be to adapt Gert’s distinction between
rational requiring strength and rational justifying strength. One can accept Permission
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(One further point. I noted in section I that the comparative size of S
relative to the set of all supererogatory actions is controversial. Horgan
and Timmons, for instance, hold that at least some supererogatory
actions are supported only by ‘favouring’ rather than ‘requiring’
reasons, and hence that one needn’t be required to perform them even if
they involve no sacrifice (such as taking a stranger on a fun outing). But
my view seems to treat moral reasons as always of rational requiring
strength, and if so S is coextensive with the set of all supererogatory
actions. However, my view is flexible on this point. To capture the
possibility of a narrower S, one might add a clause to Authority, holding
that any moral favouring reason (if, in fact, such things exist) is also
a pro tanto rational favouring reason. If this is right, one might then
amend Permission to claim that if a particular act ϕ is morally favoured
with respect to a rationally permitted act ψ, ϕ-ing is rationally permitted
(though merely morally favoured acts would not be required). This
would hold that actions supported by favouring reasons are permissible,
not required; they are morally better than is rationally required, and
hence they are supererogatory without being within the scope of S.)
This view can accommodate the anti-rationalist view successfully.
Take Rose. If we accept the standard account of intra-moral rationality,
we should say that Rose (given the strongest balance of moral reasons)
is morally required to assist the family. But, if we deny Supremacy and
accept Permission, we have the power to accommodate the suggestion
that Rose’s morally required action is, in fact, supererogatory. Rose has
prudential reason to avoid assisting this family. Thus though assisting
the family is morally good, indeed morally required, it need not be
rationally required in light of Rose’s sacrifice in so doing, and hence
Rose is rationally permitted not to assist the family. But given that
if one accepts that the prudential reason to ψ can, at best, rationally justify, but cannot
rationally require ψ -ing. In other words, non-moral reasons lack rational requiring
strength, but maintain rational justifying strength. On this view, one will have rational
permission to perform a morally suboptimal act if the prudential reason to do so is
of sufficient comparative weight to the moral reason to avoid the morally suboptimal
act. Supremacy, on this view, fails: I can be rationally justified in acting in a morally
suboptimal way (depending, of course, on the weight of the non-moral reasons involved).
Nevertheless, because non-moral reasons cannot require a person to behave in a morally
suboptimal way, acting in a morally better way is always permitted, satisfying Permission.
One complication: sometimes non-moral reasons can rationally require. If, for instance,
morality is indifferent between ϕ-ing and ψ-ing and one has stronger prudential reason
to ψ, some might hold that it is irrational (given this prudential reason) to ϕ. Such a
verdict, however, does not require a radical revision. One might say that though non-
moral reasons have rational requiring strength, the rational requiring strength of moral
reasons lexically dominates, or trumps, the rational requiring strength of non-moral
reasons. This entails that when morality is not indifferent between ϕ and ψ, non-moral
reasons cannot require one or the other. But in a case of moral indifference, given that
there is equal moral rational requiring reason to ϕ rather than ψ, the comparatively
insignificant non-moral rational requiring reason can tip the balance.
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assisting the family is morally better than is rationally required, Rose
has rational permission to assist the family as well (given Permission).
Hence assisting the family, for Rose, is supererogatory. The same
applies in the case of Urmson’s soldier. One might say that, given the
lives at stake, there is surely greater moral reason for the soldier to
throw himself on the grenade than to refrain. But given that this action,
quite literally, is an instance of self-sacrifice, we should expect that the
denial of Supremacy entails that, at least in this case, the soldier is
rationally permitted not to hurl himself on the grenade.
If we accept Permission and reject Supremacy, we can accept that
a supererogatory action is morally better than the merely rationally
erogatory action (satisfying Morally Good II). This view can also accept
that supererogatory acts are rationally permitted, but not required
(satisfying Permissible not Required II). And this view can also accept
that, were it not for the required sacrifice – that is, the prudential
reasons against – supererogatory actions would be rationally required;
without prudential sacrifice to rationally justify a morally suboptimal
act, one is rationally required to perform the action for which there
is overriding moral reason (satisfying But for Sacrifice II). To accept
Permission but deny Supremacy in the way just illustrated is necessary
and sufficient to accommodate the existence of supererogatory actions
on the anti-rationalist view.
VIII. OBJECTIONS
So the anti-rationalist view is possible to accommodate. But that doesn’t
mean that it’s plausible. I respond to three potential reasons to reject
it here. First, I argue that the anti-rationalist view does not require
an implausible first-order account of supererogatory actions. Second,
I argue that though some might object to the denial of Supremacy∗,
one should not consider the ability to accommodate Supremacy∗ an
advantage of the traditional view. Third, some might argue that this
form of anti-rationalism view faces problems – just as the Portmore/Raz
view did – with Stan. I argue that this is not so.
VIII.1. Practical reason and the supererogatory
The anti-rationalist view holds that any action that is morally better
than is rationally required is eligible for the epithet ‘supererogatory’.22
But this view might generate a range of very implausible verdicts
depending on the first-order theory of all-things-considered practical
reason one accepts. Consider, e.g., Sidgwick’s classic dualism of
22 Subject to any further conditions one might wish to place on the category of the
supererogatory, explored in section VIII.3.
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practical reason.23 This view (or, at any rate, my interpretation) holds
that one is always rationally permitted to behave in accordance with
the demands of either prudence or morality. On this view, because no
acts of any moral quality at all are rationally required, any act that
even has the barest moral worth in comparison to advancing one’s self-
interest is supererogatory. But if this is right, the anti-rationalist view
will implausibly extend the category of the supererogatory.
Of course, some substantive theories of rationality, when combined
with the anti-rationalist view, may result in an implausible set of
supererogatory actions. But this is no objection. If we accept the anti-
rationalist view, our considered judgements about which actions are
supererogatory are fair game when it comes to evaluating theories
of rationality, as they have been all along in evaluating theories of
morality (and intra-moral rationality) under the traditional view. If
so, there is no reason to believe that the true theory of our rational
requirements will offer an implausibly inflated or deflated set of
supererogatory actions. If the dualist view is committed to a range of
supererogatory actions that stretches considered judgement, we should
reject that view. This move is no more problematic than the traditional
rejection of, e.g., act-consequentialism on the basis of the traditional
view.
Furthermore, note that the anti-rationalist view can accept that
exactly the same actions that the traditional view declares are
supererogatory are, in fact, supererogatory. When we seek to determine
whether any action is supererogatory (whatever the analysis) we ask
whether that action is among those that make up ‘how we should live’.
If ϕ is not part of ‘how we should live’, but is perhaps morally better
than we can permissibly live, any view that accepts Supremacy will
interpret this as an instance of action that is morally better than is
morally required, and hence that ϕ-ing is supererogatory. But a view
that rejects Supremacy will treat ‘how I should live’ not as capturing my
moral requirements, but as capturing my rational requirements. Hence
this view will suggest that ϕ is not necessarily morally better than is
morally required, but is morally better than is rationally required, and
is therefore supererogatory.24 The anti-rationalist view is sensitive to
precisely the same considered judgements as the traditional view, and
hence needn’t deviate from any verdicts that the traditional view can
coherently accept.
23 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. (Indianapolis, 1981 [1907]), pp.
507–9.
24 For a more in-depth argument to this effect, see Dale Dorsey, ‘Weak Anti-
Rationalism and the Demands of Morality’, Noûs 46 (2012), pp. 1–23.
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VIII.2. Denying Supremacy∗25
The anti-rationalist view is coherent and extensionally correct. But it
is, after all, an anti-rationalist view. On my proposal, to accommodate
the existence of the supererogatory, we must be anti-rationalists. This
might be in principle implausible, as well as implausible in application.
After all, is it plausible to say that Rose is morally required to assist
the family in question, but rationally permitted not to do so?
I don’t have the space to defend moral anti-rationalism in every nook
and cranny; I have tried to do so elsewhere.26 But as a general point, I
think there are two reasons why we should temper our scepticism about
the form of anti-rationalism at play here. First, to adopt Supremacy∗
is to adopt a rather mild form of anti-rationalism about the moral
point of view. Recall that to reject Supremacy∗ one need not reject
Permission, or claim that non-moral reasons will be decisive against
reasons to conform to moral requirements. Rather, all one need believe
is that moral agents, at least on occasion, will have rational permission
to perform morally suboptimal acts. My view can accept the claim that
conforming to morally decisive actions will often be rationally decisive,
depending on the relative strength of the moral and non-moral reasons
involved. If it is morally required of me not to harm someone else for
a mild chuckle, it is perfectly compatible with my view to say that
refraining from such harm is rationally required: the prudential reason
in favour of harming someone, in this case, is too weak in comparison
to the moral reason against to rationally justify such harm.
Of course, Supremacy∗ is, to some, very plausible. But it seems to me
that the ability to accommodate it comes to very little qua advantage.
The traditional view grants no greater rational authority to moral
considerations than the anti-rationalist view. In fact, as defined here,
both views must deny Supremacy. The traditional view suggests that
though moral requirements are rationally overriding, moral reasons
themselves do not fully determine our rational obligations, and hence
it is not the case that moral reasons have overriding practical authority
as defined by Supremacy. Moral reasons are (on Raz’s view) justly
ignored in determining how one ought to live. Hence the extent to
which one’s rational requirements are determined by moral reasons on
the anti-rationalist view is precisely equivalent to the extent to which
moral reasons determine one’s rational requirements on the traditional
view, when combined with Supremacy∗. This still leaves a number of
paradoxes surrounding the traditional view, which I argue defeat it.
25 I argue for the claims in this section in much greater detail in Dorsey, ‘Weak Anti-
Rationalism’.
26 See Dorsey, ‘Weak Anti-Rationalism’; Dorsey, ‘Against the Supremacy of Morality’,
MS.
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But those concerned about the rational authority of morality should
not be worried to any additional extent about the anti-rationalist view.
Here’s another way to see this point. Both the traditional and anti-
rationalist views will say, of Rose (for instance), that the strongest
balance of moral reasons favours her assisting the family. Both views
will say that the strongest balance of moral reasons needn’t capture
‘how Rose should live’. The difference between the views relies only
on their acceptance or rejection of the standard account of intra-
moral rationality, and hence whether the denial of Supremacy entails
the denial of Supremacy∗. For the purposes of argument, I’m willing
to admit that to accept Supremacy∗, and hence to describe Rose’s
potential failure to assist the family as morally permitted, might very
well be plausible.27 But this advantage seems to me dwarfed by the
advantages of the anti-rationalist view. Ultimately any choice between
the traditional view and the anti-rationalist view must be made on the
basis of their relative strengths and weaknesses. Different people will
have different intuitions on this score. But as far as I’m concerned,
given the mildness of the form of anti-rationalism in play and the
identical treatment of Supremacy, any implausibility that remains in
the denial of Supremacy∗ is more than compensated for by the ability
to accept the standard picture of intra-moral rationality, and avoid a
bloated conception of moral justification. At the very least, enough has
been said to grant the anti-rationalist view a very serious hearing.
VIII.3. Reconsidering Stan
At the end of section VI, I argued that the anti-rationalist view
is to be preferred to the traditional view on grounds that it can
avoid the traditional view’s troubling implication that Stan could be
morally justified in subjecting Jerry to beatings even if Stan’s welfare
is comparatively morally insignificant. The final objection, however,
holds that this advantage is chimerical. My view might be committed
to a conclusion that is, for all intents and purposes, identical. After
all, I hold that prudential reasons might be balanced against moral
reasons from the perspective of all-things-considered obligations, and
it might be the case that in certain circumstances, prudential reasons
are sufficient to grant rational permission to perform actions that do
not conform to moral requirements. Why, then, haven’t I rationally
justified Stan’s beating of Jerry? And if I have, haven’t I implausibly
made his refraining from so doing supererogatory?
There are two questions that should be separated here, however. The
first concerns whether my view is committed to the claim that Stan’s
27 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer.
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beating of Jerry for the purpose of purchasing a new car can possibly
be justified. The second concerns whether my view is committed to the
claim that Stan’s beating of Jerry for the purpose of purchasing a new
car can possibly be supererogatory. Take the first question. The anti-
rationalist view holds that one is morally required to donate in Gus’s
case, and is morally required not to beat up Jerry in Stan’s case. But
if Gus’s prudential interest in a new car can rationally justify failing
his moral obligation to save ten, and refraining from beating up Jerry
is not morally more important than saving ten, it would appear that
Stan’s prudential interest in a new car can rationally justify ignoring
his moral obligation not to beat up Jerry.
I have two responses, the first more tentative than the second. First,
assuming the truth of a prima facie plausible conjecture, the anti-
rationalist view can avoid this conclusion in a way that the traditional
view cannot. Notice that, for the anti-rationalist view, non-moral
considerations cannot count against the permission to conform to moral
reasons (given Permission). But this says nothing about the ability of
non-moral reasons to count against the permission to conform to other
non-moral reasons. But – and here’s the conjecture – there seems a bevy
of non-moral reasons that count against beating up Jerry that need not
count in favour of saving ten. Reasons of neighbourliness, association,
to say nothing of etiquette, may in fact require Stan not to beat up
Jerry, the force of which may be enough to outweigh Stan’s prudential
interests (especially when combined with the moral requirement not to
do so). Notice that the traditional view cannot make the same claim.
If reasons of etiquette, neighbourliness, etc., are genuinely non-moral,
they have no power morally to require actions and hence cannot tell
against Stan’s moral justification to beat up Jerry. (Furthermore, if
they’re per se moral considerations, they are no help. As we have already
seen, the moral factors involved have already been accounted for in (2),
i.e. the moral justification to beat up Jerry to save ten.) Of course,
this response requires a controversial account of the moral point of
view, viz., that the moral point of view does not include reasons of
neighbourliness, etiquette, association, etc. But the schematic point
stands: if there are genuinely non-moral reasons that require one not
to beat up Stan, which I hereby leave as a plausible conjecture, the anti-
rationalist view can (in principle, anyway) avoid the problem faced by
the traditional view in Stan’s case.
But let’s say, for the moment, that this response is not available.
Let’s say that the anti-rationalist view is committed to Stan’s rational
justification to beat up Jerry (perhaps because my conjecture fails or for
some other reason). Even if this is correct, the anti-rationalist view is
in a better position than the traditional view. As noted throughout,
the anti-rationalist view and traditional view take very different
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justificatory stances towards Stan’s dastardly deed. The problem with
the traditional view was never that Stan is justified in beating up Jerry,
but rather that the traditional view is saddled with an implausible
claim about morality, viz. that Stan is morally justified in beating up
Jerry. I admit that some will think that both verdicts are implausible.
But if Stan is to be justified, my approach is comparatively palatable:
I needn’t, but the traditional view must, claim that Stan is morally
justified.
Take now the second question. Must my account hold that, were Stan
not to harm Jerry, his action would be supererogatory? Of course, all
the same responses apply: if my conjecture is right, the anti-rationalist
view is not committed to this result, and if it is, the traditional view is
no less committed. But leave this aside. Both views are licensed to reject
the claim that Stan’s action is supererogatory. One could, in principle,
restrict the epithet ‘supererogatory’ to only a subset of morally good, but
not rationally required, actions by further supplementing one’s analysis
of the supererogatory. Some hold that an action is supererogatory only
if it is somehow beneficent.28 If we accept this view, Gus’s donation
(which is beneficent) would be supererogatory, but Stan’s failure to
beat up Jerry (which isn’t) wouldn’t. On whether this further limiting
constraint is all-things-considered plausible, I am officially neutral.
One might suggest that admitting that the traditional view can avoid
marking Stan’s failure to beat up Jerry as supererogatory saps any
motivation for adopting the anti-rationalist view. But this is not so. The
problem with the traditional view is that it relies on an extensionally
incorrect theory of moral justification. The traditional view must accept
the claim that Stan’s harming of Jerry is morally justified, whether or
not it is officially ‘supererogatory’. This renders the traditional view, in




The traditional view is puzzling. To accept the combination of
Permissible not Required, Morally Good and But for Sacrifice, we
must accept a form of intra-moral rationality that stretches the limits
of moral justification. However, we can accommodate the existence
of the supererogatory without altering the structure of intra-moral
rationality if we assume that supererogatory actions just are those that
are morally good, but for which one does not have decisive practical
28 Heyd, Supererogation, p. 137. For a contrary view, see Gregory Mellema, Beyond the
Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and Offence (Albany, 1991), ch. 2.
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reason. This approach to the supererogatory perfectly captures the
category of actions for which the supererogatory was designed: those
actions that go beyond the call of one’s duty.
But my view is significant for a further reason. As noted
in the introduction, a traditional objection holds that act-
consequentialism cannot accommodate the supererogatory. After all,
act-consequentialism requires agents to maximize the value of
consequences in every case, leaving no room for actions to be ‘better’
than is morally required. Morality, according to act-consequentialism,
demands the best. This objection requires the traditional view for its
cogency: it must be that someone can go beyond duty from within the
moral point of view. But if my analysis is correct, this objection fails.
The supererogatory is not an intra-moral category. The supererogatory
exists between the demands of morality and the demands of practical
rationality. Hence it is illegitimate to reject act-consequentialism on the
grounds that this theory cannot accommodate the supererogatory.29
The supererogatory is not a method to evaluate first-order moral
theories, but rather a method by which to evaluate theories of all-
things-considered practical rationality.
But while we’re on the subject, in addition to not being an objection
to act-consequentialism, the existence of the supererogatory is grist for
the consequentialist’s mill. If the supererogatory is best understood as
a way in which the demands of practical reason separate from the de-
mands of morality, to accommodate the supererogatory we must adopt
a first-order moral theory that can plausibly explain this cleavage.
But, famously, the demands of act-consequentialism do not plausibly
match up with that which a given person is rationally required to
do.30 Hence, because act-consequentialism can plausibly explain the
distinction between moral requirements and rational requirements,
act-consequentialism is well placed to explain the existence of the su-
pererogatory: sometimes morally required action is simply supereroga-
tory, or beyond the call of that which we ought, rationally, to do.31
ddorsey@ku.edu
29 Consider, for instance, Jason Kawall, ‘Virtue Theory, Ideal Observers, and the
Supererogatory’, Philosophical Studies 146 (2009), pp. 179–96.
30 Paul Hurley, Beyond Consequentialism (Oxford, 2009); Dorsey, ‘Weak Anti-
Rationalism’.
31 Many thanks are due to Doug Portmore, who offered extensive comments on this
article on two separate occasions. I would also like to thank Derek Baker, Jack Bricke,
Ann Cudd, Ben Eggleston, Howard Nye, Matt Talbert, various participants at the 2010
Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, as well as a very helpful audience at St Andrews
University.
